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ARTICLES
NORTH CAROLINA'S DECLARATION OF RIGHTS:
FERTILE GROUND IN A FEDERAL CLIMATE
GRANT E. BUCKNER*
"A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely neces-
sary to preserve the blessings of liberty."'
PART 1. INTRODUCTION
Article I of the North Carolina Constitution declares thirty-seven
rights to its citizens.' Although a number of these rights have analogs
in the Federal Constitution-particularly in the Bill of Rights and in
the Reconstruction Amendments-the State's constitutional protec-
tions are more numerous, more detailed, and often textually distinct
from their federal counterparts.' Indeed, many of these declared
rights predate the Bill of Rights, while others are responsive to them.4
This departure from the Federal Constitution is not unique to North
Carolina. In fact, North Carolina's Constitution, particularly Article
I's Declaration of Rights, is very similar to the constitutions of her
sister states.' Since the 1970s, and for a variety of reasons, the unique-
* Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Robert N. Hunter, Jr., North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals. The ideas and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the
ideas and opinions of Judge Hunter or the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The author would
like to thank former Chief Justice James G. Exum, Jr. for his mentorship, input, and feedback on
this article.
1. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.
2. See id. §§ 1-37 (collectively, the "Declaration of Rights").
3. Compare, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."),
with N.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 30 ("A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing
armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military
shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Nothing herein
shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the General Assembly from
enacting penal statutes against that practice.").
4. See JoHN V. Ourni, TiH NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSrrruTON 3-85 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2011). To trace the historical sources for the original Declaration of Rights, adopted De-
cember 17, 1776, see John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. RE v. 1759,
1797-802 (1992).
5. See Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 989
(1996) (reviewing the origins and history of state constitutions).
145
1
Buckner: North Carolina's Declaration of Rights: Fertile Ground in a Feder
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2014
146 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:145
ness of state constitutions has been the foundation for a renaissance in
state constitutional interpretation and scholarship. 6
It would seem plain, then, that the Declaration of Rights is fertile
ground for state constitutional claims.' However, despite the obvious
differences between the Declaration of Rights and the Federal Consti-
tution, and notwithstanding the insistence of legal scholars, constitu-
tional adjudication in North Carolina invariably deals with federal
questions. To illustrate this point, consider Figure 1.8
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6. See Randall T. Shepard, The Renaissance in State Constitutional Law: There are a Few
Dangers, But What's the Alternative?, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1529 (1998) (chronicling, critiquing, and
defending the movement). See also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protec-
tions of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977) (representing a clarion call for the
movement).
7. And, to be sure, there have been many North Carolina legal scholars and jurists who
have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., James G. Exum, Jr., Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70
N.C. L. REv. 1741, 1748 (1992) ("I hope this issue of the North Carolina Law Review will make
all who read it aware of the fertility of the field of state constitutional law. It is, indeed, time to
dust off these hallowed documents and use them in the service of freedom and justice for all.");
Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Individual Liberties": North Carolina Accepts the Chal-
lenge, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1749 (1992) ("The North Carolina Supreme Court has made it clear
that practitioners may, and should, look to the North Carolina Constitution as a rich and vibrant
source of personal liberties."); Mark D. Martin & Daniel F.E. Smith, Recent Experience with
Intermediate Scrutiny Under the North Carolina Constitution: Blankenship v. Bartlett and King ex
rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of Education, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 761, 766 (2010)
("Th[e] combination of greater detail and increased responsiveness in North Carolina's constitu-
tion provides a potentially 'fertile ground' for litigants to plant their claims.").
8. The data in Figure 1 was gathered by performing the following searches: (1) LexisNexis:
N.C. Federal and State Cases Combined: Opinion ("N.C. Const." or "N.C.Const."), restricted to
previous 10 years; and (2) Westlaw: N.C. State and Federal Cases: op ("N.C. Const." or
"N.C.Const."), restricted to previous 10 years. "U.S." replaced "N.C." to perform the federal
search in both databases. The searches were conducted on April 26, 2013 and follow a procedure
similar to that used by Martin & Smith, supra note 7, at 768 n.41.
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Over the last decade, North Carolina state and federal courts have
cited the U.S. Constitution in far more opinions than the North Caro-
lina Constitution.' There are at least two good reasons for this.
First, North Carolina Law schools-like most around the nation-
focus on federal constitutional law in their curriculum.'o North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr., who often teaches
at various law schools in the state, has lamented on this very subject in
a recent issue of the Elon Law Review:
Each year I ask my upper-level students if they have read or seen a
copy of the Constitution of North Carolina. Most have not read or
seen the state's Constitution and do not have an understanding of the
historical context within which it was formed. This is particularly un-
fortunate because the Constitution is tested on the bar examination
and because most graduates of North Carolina's law schools will begin
practice in the state without a fundamental grounding in the state's
organic legal document."
The situation is even more troubling when one considers the fact that
many law clerks, tasked with writing opinions for state judges, are al-
most exclusively trained in federal constitutional law. As James Acker
and Elizabeth Walsh have put it, "[r]eliance upon state constitutions,
either by litigants pressing claims or the courts deciding them, [has
become] a forgotten art."12
Second, the North Carolina Supreme Court has largely adopted a
lockstep method of state constitutional interpretation' 3-meaning, the
Court interprets parallel state constitutional provisions in keeping
with the federal courts' interpretation of their federal counterparts. 1 4
This "non-approach" to state constitutional interpretation results in
deferential conformity to the Supreme Court of the United States and
diminishes the identity of the state constitution as a separate legal
document.15
9. Figure 1 does not distinguish cases that merely offer a parallel citation to the North
Carolina Constitution. Thus, it is likely that a portion of the cases citing to the North Carolina
Constitution do so in a cursory fashion without serious state constitutional interpretation.
10. See Shepard, supra note 6, at 1533-34 ("Lawyers, who might be expected to inform
citizens of the present potential inherent in state constitutions, also appear to be all too ill-
informed about the substance of their state charter. In their defense of course, one need ac-
knowledge that classes on state constitutional law are not a ubiquitous feature of American law
school curricula.").
11. Robert N. Hunter, Jr., The Past as Prologue: Albion Tourgie and the North Carolina
Constitution, 5 ELON L. Ri'v. 89, 93 (2013).
12. James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State Con-
stitutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1312 (1989).
13. Martin & Smith, supra note 7, at 771.
14. Id. ("The lockstep model construes state constitutional provisions identically with anal-
ogous provisions in the U.S. Constitution.").
15. See Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of
10,000 Lakes: Minnesota's Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the United States
3
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Even so, it is the central thesis of this article that the Declaration of
Rights is fertile ground for the North Carolina bench and bar. Accord-
ingly, the purpose of this exposition is to urge application of the Dec-
laration of Rights on behalf of North Carolinians in the state's courts.
To this end, Part II of this article provides a brief historical and de-
scriptive overview of the Declaration of Rights, including a compari-
son to the analogous provisions in the Federal Constitution. Part III
lays out the argument proper, setting forth multiple bases to accept
the central thesis. Part IV serves as a call to action, detailing the im-
portance of this endeavor and the steps that can be taken to see it
through.
PART 11. THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
Abraham Lincoln is often credited as saying, "give me six hours to
chop down a tree and I will spend the first four sharpening the axe."16
Accordingly, given the relative neglect of the North Carolina Consti-
tution as compared to the Federal Constitution, it is essential to pro-
vide a brief overview of the Declaration of Rights, its origin, and its
application by the North Carolina Supreme Court.'7 With this context
in hand, the importance of its application can be understood and ap-
preciated. Let us sharpen our axe.
A. Historical and Descriptive Overview
Two months before the signing of the Declaration of Independence,
in May of 1776, the Continental Congress passed a resolution advising
the colonies to form new governments." With independence from the
Crown declared on July 4, 1776, and with the newly vested authority
of general sovereignty, each new state drafted its own constitution."
In North Carolina, a constitutional convention passed the Declaration
of Rights on December 17, 1776, one day before the State's first con-
stitution was adopted.2 o "Although treated separately, the two docu-
ments form[ed] a single whole, the latter expressly declaring the
former 'Part of the Constitution of this State."'21
Importantly, and unlike the Federal Constitution, the Declaration
of Rights has always appeared before the structural portions of the
and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 880-81 (2007) (describing and critiquing the
lockstep approach).
16. Abraham Lincoln, 16th President of the United States (1809-1869).
17. For a comprehensive historical treatment of the North Carolina Constitution, see ORHIi,
supra note 4.
18. Holland, supra note 5, at 989.
19. Id. at 989-90.
20. ORTH, supra note 4, at 5.
21. Id. (quoting N.C. CONsT. of 1776, § 44).
4
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constitution.2 2 Justice Harry Martin, writing for the North Carolina
Supreme Court, indicated that this ordering "manifest[s] the primacy
of the Declaration in the minds of the framers." 23 Indeed, a stated
purpose of the Declaration is "[t]hat the great, general, and essential
principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and es-
tablished." 24 Thus, in the minds of the framers, a free government can-
not be established without certain defining and binding principles.
Since the original Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1776, the
North Carolina Constitution has been amended numerous times, and
has been replaced twice.25 The first replacement came in 1868, when
the "Reconstruction Constitution" was approved in a state election.2 6
The Declaration of Rights largely reappeared as Article I, where it has
remained since.2 7 The second replacement, and North Carolina's cur-
rent constitution, was approved by voters in 1970 and made effective
on July 1, 1971.28
The provisions found in the current Declaration of Rights are of
both the general and specific variety. For example, compare the gen-
eral announcement of Article I, § 1 ("We hold it to be self-evident
that all persons are created equal; that they are endowed by their cre-
ator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of hap-
piness.") with the specific command of Article I, § 26 ("No person
shall be excluded from jury service on account of sex, race, color, re-
ligion, or national origin."). However, whether general or specific, all
37 of these declarations are "rights" of the people, and all point to the
"ideological premises that underlie the structure of government." 29
As a testament to the importance and the primacy of the Declara-
tion of Rights over the years, it is significant that most of its provisions
can be traced back through the Reconstruction Constitution to the
original constitution of 1776.30 Indeed, "by far the most stable provi-
sions of North Carolina's organic law have been those safeguards of
22. Id. at 6 ("North Carolina's declaration of rights, like those of her sister states, is logi-
cally, as well as chronologically, prior to the constitutional text, providing a statement of general
and abstract principles given particular and concrete realization in the constitution proper.").
23. Corum v. Univ. of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992).
24. N.C. CONsr. art. I, introduction.
25. See ORwrnI, supra note 4, at 3-37.
26. Id. at 19. Notably, "[r]atification of the 1868 Constitution and of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution earned North Carolina readmission to representation in
Congress and the end of Reconstruction." Id. at 23.
27. Id. at 19. A few changes and additions were made to the Declaration of Rights at this
time, largely addressing concerns raised by the Civil War and Reconstruction. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 44.
30. Id. at 43.
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due process expressed in the declaration of rights." 3 1 It is for this rea-
son that the state's constitutional directives "must be observed by all,"
as "[i]t is not in accord with the nature of written constitutions to in-
corporate nonessential or unimportant details which may be dis-
pensed with." 32
B. State Constitutional Interpretation in North Carolina-The
Lockstep Approach
Although in many ways this article seeks to distinguish the provi-
sions in the Declaration of Rights from their federal counterparts, it is
necessary at this point to compare them. To this end, consider the
analogous provisions, presented side-by-side, in Table 1.3
Table 1. The United States Constitution and the Declaration of
Rights: Side-by-Side Comparison of the Analogous Provisions.
U.S. CONsr. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CoNs'. amend. II:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 12:
The people have a right to assemble
together to consult for their common
good, to instruct their representatives,
and to apply to the General Assembly
for redress of grievances; but secret
political societies are dangerous to the
liberties of a free people and shall not
be tolerated.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 13:
All persons have a natural and inalienable
right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own
consciences, and no human authority
shall, in any case whatever, control or
interfere with the rights of conscience.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 14:
Freedom of speech and of the press are
two of the great bulwarks of liberty and
therefore shall never be restrained, but
every person shall be held responsible
for their abuse.
N.C. CONsT. art I, § 30:
A well regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; and, as standing armies
in time of peace are dangerous to
liberty, they shall not be maintained,
and the military shall be kept under
31. Id. at 36.
32. Advisory Op. in re H.B. No. 65, 227 N.C. 708, 713, 43 S.E.2d 73, 76 (1947).
33. Table 1 contains only the analogous provisions, and therefore not every provision, found
in the Declaration of Rights.
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strict subordination to, and governed by,
the civil power. Nothing herein shall
justify the practice of carrying concealed
weapons, or prevent the General
Assembly from enacting penal statutes
against that practice.
U.S. CONsT. amend. III:
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed
by law.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime
N.C. CONST. art I, § 31:
No soldier shall in time of peace be
quartered in any house without the
consent of the owner, nor in time of war
but in a manner prescribed by law.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 20:
General warrants, whereby any officer or
other person may be commanded to
search suspected places without evidence
of the act committed, or to seize any
person or persons not named, whose
offense is not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are dangerous to
liberty and shall not be granted.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 22:
Except in misdemeanor cases initiated in
the District Court Division, no person
shall be put to answer any criminal
charge but by indictment, presentment,
or impeachment. But any person, when
represented by counsel, may, under such
regulations as the General Assembly
shall prescribe, waive indictment in
noncapital cases.
N.C. CoNsT. art I, § 23:
In all criminal prosecutions, every person
charged with crime has the right to be
informed of the accusation and to
confront the accusers and witnesses with
other testimony, and to have counsel for
defense, and not be compelled to give
self-incriminating evidence, or to pay
costs, jail fees, or necessary witness fees
of the defense, unless found guilty.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 24:
No person shall be convicted of any crime
but by the unanimous verdict of a jury
in open court. The General Assembly
may, however, provide for other means
of trial for misdemeanors, with the right
of appeal for trial de novo.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 18:
All courts shall be open; every person for
an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person, or reputation shall have remedy
by due course of law; and right and
7
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shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII:
In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common
law.
justice shall be administered without
favor, denial, or delay.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 23:
In all criminal prosecutions, every person
charged with crime has the right to be
informed of the accusation and to
confront the accusers and witnesses with
other testimony, and to have counsel for
defense, and not be compelled to give
self-incriminating evidence, or to pay
costs, jail fees, or necessary witness fees
of the defense, unless found guilty.
N.C. CONs-r. art I, § 25:
In all controversies at law respecting
property, the ancient mode of trial by
jury is one of the best securities of the
rights of the people, and shall remain
sacred and inviolable.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: N.C. CONST. art I, § 27:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or
unusual punishments inflicted. unusual punishments inflicted.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IX: N.C. CONST. art I, § 36:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of The enumeration of rights in this Article
certain rights, shall not be construed to shall not be construed to impair or deny
deny or disparage others retained by the others retained by the people.
people.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: N.C. CoNs'. art I, § 17:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, Slavery is forever prohibited. Involuntary
except as a punishment for crime servitude, except as a punishment for
whereof the party shall have been duly crime whereof the parties have been
convicted, shall exist within the United adjudged guilty, is forever prohibited.
States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 1:
We hold it to be self-evident that all
persons are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are
life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits
of their own labor, and the pursuit of
happiness.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 19:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in
any manner deprived of his life, liberty,
or property, but by the law of the land.
No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws; nor shall any
person be subjected to discrimination by
8
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U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2:
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3:
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1:
No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money;
emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but
gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts,
or grant any Title of Nobility.
the State because of race, color, religion,
or national origin.
N.C. CONsT. art I, § 21:
Every person restrained of his liberty is
entitled to a remedy to inquire into the
lawfulness thereof, and to remove the
restraint if unlawful, and that remedy
shall not be denied or delayed. The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended.
N.C. CONsT. art I, § 16:
Retrospective laws, punishing acts
committed before the existence of such
laws and by them only declared
criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and
incompatible with liberty, and therefore
no ex post facto law shall be enacted.
No law taxing retrospectively sales,
purchases, or other acts previously done
shall be enacted.
Table 1 displays, in the left-hand column, the Bill of Rights, the Re-
construction amendments, and other federal constitutional provisions
to which there is, in the right-hand column, an analogous state provi-
sion in the Declaration of Rights.34 The fact that a number of rights
are dually protected in both constitutions raises a question of interpre-
tation when litigants bring claims under one, or both, of the
provisions.35
A review of the literature reveals that there are four major ap-
proaches that courts use when reviewing a state constitutional provi-
sion that has a federal analog-primacy, dual-sovereignty, interstitial,
and lockstep.3 6 Under the primacy approach, the court examines the
34. That this table is organized sequentially according to the federal provisions (for ease of
interpretation) is perhaps evidence of the prevailing federal climate in the field of constitutional
law.
35. The easiest question of interpretation arises, of course, when a litigant raises a state
constitutional claim to which there is no federal counterpart. Take for example, Article 1, § 15:
"The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and
maintain that right." N.C. CONsTr. art. 1, § 15. Under such provisions, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has no choice but to engage in independent state constitutional interpretation, and
indeed, this is what has been done. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249
(1997) (recognizing the constitutional right of every child in the state to receive a "sound basic
education" in the public schools).
36. A comprehensive treatment and evaluation of these four approaches is beyond the
scope of this article. For more information about these approaches, including a critique, see
generally Anderson & Oseid, supra note 15, at 879-86; and Acker & Walsh, supra note 12, at
1315-19.
9
Buckner: North Carolina's Declaration of Rights: Fertile Ground in a Feder
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2014
154 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:145
state constitution first and considers it the fundamental source of indi-
vidual rights." Federal constitutional provisions and precedent are
only considered if the individual right at issue is not protected under
the state's constitutional provisions." Under the dual-sovereignty ap-
proach, the court examines the claim simultaneously under both the
state and federal provision, deciding the case based on the provision
that offers the greatest protection." Under the interstitial approach,
the court looks first at the federal provision and precedent, deeming it
presumptively correct, and then raises the federal floor of protection
using the state constitution where appropriate.40
The North Carolina Supreme Court generally takes the final ap-
proach to state constitutional interpretation-the lockstep approach.4 '
Under the lockstep approach, the court construes state constitutional
provisions identically with federal court interpretations of their fed-
eral counterparts.42 Thus, interpretation of the state constitution
moves "lockstep" with the Federal Courts' interpretation of the fed-
eral constitution.
Importantly, the lockstep approach comes in two varieties: "strict"
or "binding lockstep" and "persuasive lockstep."43 Adherents to strict
lockstep allow federal interpretations of the Federal Constitution to
dictate the meaning of the analogous state provision.4 4 The state
courts effectively assume a position of absolute deference to, and con-
formity with, the federal courts.4 5 By contrast, adherents to persua-
sive lockstep, while acknowledging federal precedent as highly
persuasive, reserve the right to deviate in certain situations.4 6 North
Carolina falls into the persuasive lockstep camp.47
37. Anderson & Oseid, supra note 15, at 885.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 884.
40. Id. at 881-82.
41. See Martin & Smith, supra note 7, at 771 ("The approach of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina is best characterized a lockstep .... ). A co-author of this cited work, Justice
Mark Martin, is currently the Senior Associate Justice on the North Carolina Supreme Court.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 772-73.
44. Acker & Walsh, supra note 12, at 1316.
45. Anderson & Oseid, supra note 15, at 880.
46. Martin & Smith, supra note 7, at 773. To some extent, the persuasive lockstep method
seems very similar to the interstitial method. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. How-
ever, perhaps the distinguishing factor is the court's focus. Under the interstitial method, "state
courts recognize the federal doctrine as the floor and focus the inquiry on whether the state
constitution offers a means of supplementing or amplifying federal rights." Robert F. Utter,
Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues
when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TIx. L. Rpv. 1025, 1028 (1985).
Under persuasive lockstep, "supplementing or amplifying federal rights" can be seen as a side
effect of deviating from federal precedent, not an explicit focus or endgame.
47. Martin & Smith, supra note 7, at 772. See also Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N.
Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974) ("[Iun the construction of [a]
10
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State v. Petersilie" provides an example of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court's usage of persuasive lockstep. In that case, the defen-
dant was convicted of eleven counts of publishing unsigned materials
about a candidate for public office in contravention of a state stat-
ute.49 The defendant challenged his conviction on free speech
grounds, alleging violations of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion.o In deciding how to interpret the claim under both provisions,
Chief Justice Exum, writing for the majority, stated:
In some of our cases, the Court has found the guarantees in the state
and federal constitutions to be parallel and has addressed them as if
their protections were equivalent. We have also recognized that in
construing provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina, this
Court is not bound by opinions of the Supreme Court of the United
States construing even identical provisions in the Constitution of the
United States. We do, however, give great weight to decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States interpreting provisions of the
Constitution of the United States which are parallel to provisions of
the State Constitution to be construed. In this case, for the purpose of
applying our State Constitution's Free Speech Clause we adopt the
United State's Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.5 1
Thus, State v. Petersilie generally stands for the interpretive approach
utilized by the North Carolina Supreme Court in construing analogous
state constitutional provisions-remaining deferential to federal pre-
cedent while reserving the right to be the ultimate interpreter of the
state constitution.
PART 111. THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Is FERTILE GROUND
FOR THE NORTH CAROLINA BENCH AND BAR
It is now time to cut down our tree, that is, to demonstrate that the
Declaration of Rights is fertile ground in which to plant state constitu-
tional claims in North Carolina. The following section asserts ten ar-
guments in favor of this thesis. The arguments are grouped into three
categories to provide a framework for the discussion: (A) Basic Con-
siderations, (B) Strategic Considerations, and (C) Practical
Considerations.
provision of the State Constitution, the meaning given by the Supreme Court of the United
States to even an identical term in the Constitution of the United States is, though highly persua-
sive, not binding upon this Court.").
48. State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993).
49. Id. at 169, 432 S.E.2d at 834.
50. Id. at 179, 432 S.E.2d at 838.
51. Id. at 184, 432 S.E.2d at 841 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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A. Basic Considerations
Argument 1. The North Carolina Constitution Enumerates Rights
for Which There is No Federal Counterpart
The most obvious reason to assert a state constitutional claim is ne-
cessity. When the federal constitution is silent on a claim of right that
a state constitution protects, 52 the choice is clear-assert the state
claim. An example of this type of litigation, in the education context,
was discussed previously.53 Another example relates to the most re-
cent addition to the Declaration of Rights, a provision guaranteeing
certain basic rights to the victims of crime.5 4 Article I, § 37 has no
federal constitutional analog.55 Thus, as far as state criminal proceed-
ings are concerned, § 37 is of vital importance to victims of crime in
North Carolina. Deprivations of these rights, and other rights unique
to the Declaration, must be vindicated by asserting state constitutional
claims.
Argument 2. Dually Protected Rights are Often Described in
More Detail Under The North Carolina Constitution
A second rationale for asserting a state constitutional claim is that
the individual rights at issue are often described in greater detail,
making their contours more intelligible and predictable as compared
to their federal counterparts. Explaining this phenomenon, a former
Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court has noted:
The narrower scope of protections in the United States Constitution
may be attributed to the political realities that brought about its exis-
tence. The sparse language of the Bill of Rights suggests that federal
delegates, representing a diverse and widely dispersed population and
wielding the power to dispute every word in the document, found it
difficult to agree on details or a greater number of specified rights. By
contrast, delegates to individual state constitutional conventions, who
represented more homogeneous local populations, may have found
the going somewhat easier.
As a result, state constitutions generally contain a longer list of indi-
vidual rights than the Federal Constitution, and their language is gen-
erally richer, more detailed, and more specific than that of the federal
document.56
52. This inquiry involves an examination of the constitutional texts and the precedent con-
struing those texts.
53. See supra note 35.
54. See N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 37.
55. The provision does have a federal statutory analog, applicable to criminal proceedings
in federal court. See The Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006).
56. Exum, supra note 7, at 1746.
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North Carolina's constitution is no exception. As the North Carolina
Supreme Court has noted, "[o]ur Constitution is more detailed and
specific than the federal Constitution in the protection of the rights of
its citizens."
By way of example, consider the comparison of the Second Amend-
ment right to bear arms with Article I, § 30 in Table 1. It is unclear
from the text of the Second Amendment, and the Supreme Court of
the United States has not decided, whether the right to bear arms in-
cludes the right to carry a concealed weapon in public.59 However,
Article I, § 30 explicitly states that "[n]othing herein shall justify the
practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the General As-
sembly from enacting penal statutes against that practice."6 0 Thus, the
North Carolina Constitution makes clear what the Second Amend-
ment leaves open to judicial interpretation-that the right to bear
arms does not necessarily include the right to carry a concealed
weapon in public.
The Declaration of Rights is a rich and detailed source of funda-
mental liberties. We should seek to take advantage of that detail.
Argument 3. Dually Protected Rights are Often Textually Distinct
The third reason to file a state constitutional claim is that the state
provision is often textually distinct from the federal analog, possibly
altering the plain meaning of the text.6 1 Indeed, the presence of tex-
tual differences is a neutral criterion that could persuade even a lock-
step court to deviate from the prevailing federal precedent.6 2
57. See Martin & Smith, supra note 7, at 765 ("A comparison of North Carolina's constitu-
tion with the U.S. Constitution-including its twenty-seven amendments-reveals that the North
Carolina Constitution, at 17,082 words, is just over twice as long as the U.S. Constitution, at 7708
words. While word count does not necessarily translate directly into significant constitutional
text, the larger size of the North Carolina Constitution is suggestive of more plentiful opportuni-
ties for litigants to make claims and for the judiciary to find guidance in resolving legal contro-
versies.") (internal footnotes omitted).
58. Corum v. Univ. of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992).
59. The Tenth Circuit has recently concluded there is no such right. See Peterson v. Marti-
nez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) ("[W]e conclude that the carrying of concealed firearms
is not protected by the Second Amendment . . . ."). For an extensive survey of this issue, see
Tracey B. Farrell, Annotation, Constitutionality of State Statutes and Local Ordinances Regulat-
ing Concealed Weapons, 33 A.L.R.6th 407 (2008 & Supp. Feb. 2013).
60. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 30.
61. See State v. Webb, 358 N.C. 92, 97, 591 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2004) ("Issues concerning the
proper construction of the Constitution of North Carolina are in the main governed by the same
general principles which control in ascertaining the meaning of all written instruments. In inter-
preting our Constitution-as in interpreting a statute-where the meaning is clear from the
words used, we will not search for a meaning elsewhere.") (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted).
62. Acker & Walsh, supra note 12, at 1320-21 ("[T]he legitimacy of state courts premising
decisions upon state constitutions is most apparent and least often questioned when different
13
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For example, compare the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
"cruel and unusual punishments" with Article I, § 27's prohibition of
"cruel or unusual punishments" in Table 1. This textual difference
(i.e., the conjunctive "and" vs. the disjunctive "or") suggests that the
scope of the protected right is broader under the North Carolina Con-
stitution. Consider the following excerpt from a concurring opinion in
a case dealing with these parallel provisions:
While the federal Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punish-
ments," our State Constitution prohibits "cruel or unusual punish-
ments." The conjunction in the federal Constitution has been
interpreted to limit the Eighth Amendment's prohibition to punish-
ments that are both cruel and unusual. The disjunctive term "or" in
the State Constitution expresses a prohibition on punishments more
inclusive than the Eighth Amendment.63
Such a textual distinction, and others like it, "illustrate the point
that differently worded provisions may at least provide a logical point
of departure in the quest to have different interpretations placed upon
state and federal constitutions." 64 Even if federal precedent is on a
litigant's side in a given case, the federal courts can always change
course. It is therefore vitally important to raise the parallel state claim,
particularly where textual distinctions could be to the litigant's
advantage.
B. Strategic Considerations
Argument 4. Parallel State Constitutional Provisions Can Give
More, but Never Less, Protection than their Federal
Counterparts
"[I]t is axiomatic in a union founded on the principle of federalism
that states may elevate civil rights above the federal constitutional
floor." 65 The Federal Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, sets
a minimum threshold of protection that the states must respect.66
substantive provisions, or significantly different statements of rights, distinguish the state and
federal documents.") (internal footnotes omitted).
63. Medley v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.C. 837, 845-46, 412 S.E.2d 654, 660 (1992) (Mar-
tin, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
64. Acker & Walsh, supra note 12, at 1322.
65. Martin, supra note 7, at 1750 (emphasis in original). Indeed, in the words of former
Chief Justice Rehnquist, pronouncements of the Unites States Supreme Court do not "limit the
authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitu-
tion." Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.").
14
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North Carolina's Constitution acknowledges this aspect of federalism
explicitly in the Declaration of Rights.6 7 However, "[e]ach state ...
may construe its own constitution differently from the United States
Supreme Court's construction of analogous federal constitutional pro-
visions as long as the rights the state affords its people are no less
comprehensive than those guaranteed by the parallel federal
provision."6 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged its
ability to raise individual liberty protections under parallel state
provisions:
[B]ecause the United States Constitution is binding on the states, the
rights it guarantees must be applied to every citizen by the courts of
North Carolina, so no citizen will be "accorded lesser rights" no mat-
ter how we construe the state Constitution. For all practical purposes,
therefore, the only significant issue for this Court when interpreting a
provision of our state Constitution paralleling a provision of the
United States Constitution will always be whether the state Constitu-
tion guarantees additional rights to the citizen above and beyond
those guaranteed by the parallel federal provision.69
Strategically, advocates are bound to recognize the ability of North
Carolina courts to afford greater protections under the Declaration of
Rights and to assert state constitutional claims on behalf of their cli-
ents. There are rights to be gained if they are timely asserted and
rights to be lost if they are not.
Argument 5. Cases Decided on Independent and Adequate State
Grounds are Not Reviewable in Federal Court
Strategic case planning involves considerations of appellate review,
which provides yet another reason to assert a parallel state constitu-
tional claim. "Questions concerning the proper construction and ap-
plication of the North Carolina Constitution can be answered with
finality only by [the Supreme Court of North Carolina]." 0 Thus, if a
case is decided on independent and adequate state grounds, the deci-
sion is completely insulated from federal review." In the words of Jus-
tice Brennan, "[t]he Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state cases is
limited to the correction of errors related solely to questions of federal
67. See N.C. CONsr. art. I, § 5 ("Every citizen of this State owes paramount allegiance to
the Constitution and government of the United States, and no law or ordinance of the State in
contravention or subversion thereof can have any binding force.").
68. Martin, supra note 7, at 1750-51.
69. State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 648, 503 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1998) (emphasis in original).
70. Id.
71. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) ("If the state court decision indicates
clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and indepen-
dent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.").
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law. It cannot review state court determinations of state law even
when the case also involves federal issues."72 Accordingly, litigants
seeking a level of individual protection above the "federal floor" are
better off relying on the state constitution, as any expansive interpre-
tation approved by the state's highest court will be final.
Argument 6. Federal Jurisdictional and Justiciability Barriers are
Not Present in State Court
The final strategic consideration that warrants the assertion of state
constitutional claims is the litigant's ability to have his claim decided
on the merits. Indeed, an alleged deprivation of right cannot be vindi-
cated if a litigant's case is dismissed on procedural grounds. With this
concern in mind, two characteristics of the North Carolina state courts
warrant our attention.
First, the North Carolina trial courts, unlike the federal district
courts, are courts of general jurisdiction." Thus, North Carolina
courts are not subject to the jurisdictional limitations imposed on the
federal district courts in Article III, Section 2 of the Federal Constitu-
tion.7 4 As the Declaration of Rights makes clear, all North Carolina
courts "shall be open; every person for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law;
and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or
delay.""
Second, North Carolina courts are not subject to the justiciability
requirements imposed by the "case or controversy" language7 6 in the
Federal Constitution." This is why the North Carolina Supreme Court
has, on occasion, issued advisory opinions"-a practice strictly forbid-
den in federal court.79 Accordingly, advocates would do well to assert
72. Brennan, supra note 6, at 501 n.80.
73. See N.C. CONST. art. IV § 12(3) (asserting the general jurisdiction of the Superior
Court).
74. U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2. The North Carolina trial courts are also free from the federal
statutory limitations imposed on the Federal District Courts by Congress. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
H 1331, 1332 (2006).
75. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
76. See U.S. CONs'r. art. Ill, § 2.
77. See Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, Inc., 317 N.C. 579, 584, 347 S.E.2d 25, 29
(1986) ("[W]hile we may look for guidance to federal court decisions regarding the existence or
absence of a justiciable controversy, jurisdiction within the state courts of North Carolina is not
controlled by those federal decisions but is determined by our own statutes and court deci-
sions."). See also Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 112-16,
574 S.E.2d 48, 51-52 (2002) (distinguishing the federal and state justiciability requirements).
78. See, e.g., supra note 32.
79. See generally ERWIN CIIMIiRINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND) POICss
§ 2.4 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing the prohibition against advisory opinions).
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constitutional claims in state court, where federal jurisdictional and
justiciability limitations do not exist.
C. Practical Considerations
Argument 7. State Constitutional Decisions Can be Rooted in
Local Interests and Public Policy
"There is no place like home."s0 Dorothy's familiar refrain, while
whimsical, helps to orient our focus on exactly what a state constitu-
tion is-a document that is constitutive of those who call the state
home. Accordingly, the state constitutions, and the judicial decisions
interpreting those documents, can be closely tied to the interests and
public policies of the state.8 '
Moreover, "[t]he fact that they are often both comparatively easy to
amend and more recently written or rewritten makes them much
more reflective of current and local values than the federal charter
and much more responsive to changes in those values."8 2 In this re-
gard, state constitutional decisions can have a legitimizing effect, par-
ticularly on new or controversial issues. Indeed,
[w]hen only the federal judiciary is involved in adjudicating the myr-
iad conflicts of constitutional dimension occasioned by the diversity of
values in the country, the entire nation is forced to accept a single
viewpoint and apply it in all areas and jurisdictions. Such unitary, ex-
clusive constitutional interpretation is unduly constraining and ill-
suited to our diverse society, as shown by the persistent, significant
opposition to the Supreme Court's federal constitutional mandates.83
It follows then, that litigants who wish to have their rights vindicated
based on the values and interests near and dear to their home state
should assert state constitutional claims in state court.
Argument 8. Direct Claims Against the State are Available
Under the Declaration of Rights Where There is No
Other Adequate State Remedy
In Corum v. University of North Carolina,84 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina gave all constitutional claimants a strong incentive to
80. L. FRANK BAUM, TiiE WONDERFUL WIZARD oF Oz 45 (Geo. M. Hill Co. 1900).
81. Acker & Walsh, supra note 12, at 1329 ("State supreme courts are familiar with the
unique traditions and conditions within their states and can interpret and apply their state consti-
tutions accordingly, rather than comporting with the conditions that prevail in the nation
generally.").
82. Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL.
U. L. REv. 421, 442 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Hon. James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Legitimacy of
Independent State Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1507, 1518-19 (1998).
84. Corum v. Univ. of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).
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assert their claim under the Declaration of Rights. In that case,
Corum, a Dean at Appalachian State University, was discharged from
his deanship for vocalizing opposition to the relocation of an impor-
tant collection of books, music, research reports, and artifacts. After
exhausting his administrative remedies, Corum filed suit against the
University alleging, among other things, violations of his free speech
rights under Article I, § 14 of the North Carolina Constitution.8 6
The question presented to the Supreme Court was "whether a
plaintiff has a direct cause of action under the State Constitution
against governmental defendants for alleged violations of the plain-
tiff's free speech rights."" The Court, in landmark fashion, answered
the question presented with a resounding yes." Specifically, the Court
held that "in the absence of an adequate state remedy, one whose
state constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct claim
against the State under our Constitution."" Even more, the Court
went on to hold that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot
stand as a barrier to North Carolina citizens who seek to remedy vio-
lations of their rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights.""o
Even under a narrow reading, Corum represents a major victory for
state constitutional claimants in North Carolina. The availability of a
direct cause of action against the State, and the inability of the State
to assert the defense of sovereign immunity, is a strong incentive to
assert state constitutional claims under the Declaration of Rights.
Argument 9. Independent State Constitutional Interpretation is a
Movement for Everyone
Some critics of independent state constitutional interpretation ar-
gue that the movement is a liberal, results-oriented attempt to con-
tinue the Warren Court's expansion of civil liberties protections.91 The
basis of this objection is undoubtedly Justice Brennan's 1977 article in
the Harvard Law Review, calling for a resurgence in state constitu-
tional interpretation.9 2 Commenting on the article's impact, two North
Carolina legal scholars have noted that "[w]hat Justice Brennan did,
85. Id. at 766-70, 413 S.E. 2d at 280-82.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 781, 413 S.E. 2d at 289.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Court, after emphasizing the "supremacy of rights protected in Article I," reiter-
ated the central holding by recognizing "a direct action under the State Constitution against
state officials for violation of rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights." Id. at 782, 413
S.E.2d at 290.
90. Id. at 785-86, 413 S.E.2d at 291.
91. See generally Heiple & Powell, supra note 83, at 1508-11 (acknowledging this criticism
and providing a cogent response to it).
92. See Brennan, supra note 6.
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of course, was conscript state constitutional law into the Warren Court
cause, outlining the integral role that it can play in perpetuating and
perfecting the constitutional revolution begun in the 1950s." 3
However, even if the impetus for the movement was a desire to
continue the trajectory of the Warren court,94 one need not align with
that goal to support independent state constitutional interpretation. In
the words of a former Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court,
"the continuing strength of this movement does not derive from a de-
sire to continue, at the state level, the agenda of the Warren-Brennan
Court. It derives from the aspiration of state court judges to be inde-
pendent sources of law."9 5 Indeed, state constitutional interpretation
is "independent" in the sense that it is distinct from federal jurispru-
dence, but also because it can produce results that fall at both sides of
the political spectrum.
To prove the point that independent state constitutional interpreta-
tion is a movement for everyone, a couple of local examples, one
"conservative" and one "liberal," warrant our attention. First, con-
sider Article I, § 1's declaration that "[w]e hold it to be self-evident
that all persons are created equal; that they are endowed by their Cre-
ator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happi-
ness."" The North Carolina Supreme Court, using the "fruits of their
own labor" language, in conjunction with the "law of the land"
clause, has recognized" a heightened level of scrutiny in economic
due process cases akin to the bygone Lochner v. New York" era of
the United States Supreme Court. Such an interpretation is "con-
servative" in the sense that it favors a vibrant, free economic
marketplace.
93. James G. Exum, Jr. & Louis D. Bilionis, The Warren Court and State Constitutional
Law, in TiH WARREN CouRTr: A RETROSPECTIvE 313, 317 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
94. See Shepard, supra note 82, at 421-29 (asking the question, "Whose Movement Is This,
Anyway?" and suggesting there are other starting points beyond Justice Brennan's 1977 article).
95. Id. at 421.
96. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
97. See id. § 19.
98. See, e.g., Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 518-19, 96 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1957) ("The right to
work and earn a livelihood is a property right that cannot be taken away except under the police
power of the State in the paramount public interest for reasons of health, safety, morals, or
public welfare. The right to conduct a lawful business or to earn a livelihood is regarded as
fundamental."); Treants v. Onslow Cnty., 320 N.C. 776, 778-79, 360 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1987)
("[T]he [government action] must be rationally related to a substantial government purpose.
This is the requirement article I, section 1 [of the North Carolina Constitution] imposes on gov-
ernment regulation of trades and business in the public interest."). See also Louis D. Bilionis, On
the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1803, 1807 n.13 (1992) (collecting cases).
99. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Second, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Carter,'
concluded that there is no "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule under Article I, § 20.101 Previously, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in United States v. Leon,'02 held that the Federal Con-
stitution permitted the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment where the officer acted in reasonable reliance
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.10 3 Thus, using an inde-
pendent interpretation of the North Carolina Constitution, the North
Carolina Supreme Court extended additional protection to criminal
defendants, a decidedly "liberal" result.
Accordingly, irrespective of the movement's alleged origin and mo-
tivation, independent state constitutional interpretation is for every-
one, left and right. Using neutral principles, we can extend individual
liberties for the conservative, the moderate, and the liberal-a result
that benefits us all.
Argument 10. The North Carolina Supreme Court Has Shown a
Willingness to Deviate From Lockstep in the Past
The final argument in favor of asserting state constitutional rights
need not detain us long, because it has been implicitly supported
throughout this article by frequent citation to cases where the text'O4
and holdings' indicate the Supreme Court of North Carolina's will-
ingness to deviate from its persuasive lockstep stance.' 06 Notably,
there is a more recent example as well-Blankenship v. Bartlett.'0 7 In
Blankenship, the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the state
equal protection clause to afford greater protection to voters than the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 08 Furthermore, this article has cited with
regularity scholarly works by sitting and retired North Carolina ju-
100. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).
101. Id. at 724, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (1988) ("We are not persuaded on the facts before us that
we should engraft a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under our state constitution.").
102. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
103. Id. at 926 ("In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached
and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in
preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the exis-
tence of probable cause.").
104. See, e.g., supra notes 51, 69 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., supra notes 98, 100-01 and accompanying text.
106. See also Corum, 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290 ("we give our Constitution liberal
interpretation in favor of its citizens with respect to those provisions which were designed to
safeguard the liberty and security of the citizens in regard to both person and property.").
107. Blakenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 681 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 2009). Indeed, in many ways,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has been in the business of independent state constitutional
adjudication from the very beginning. See, e.g., Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787)
(recognizing the power of judicial review in North Carolina years before Marbury v. Madison).
108. Blankenship, 363 N.C. at 522-27, 681 S.E.2d at 763-65.
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rists.' 09 There can be no more persuasive proof to assert state consti-
tutional claims under the Declaration of Rights than an explicit
invitation by the Court.
PART IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENT STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (AND STEPS TO SEE IT THROUGH)
The preceding section asserted ten arguments to make the North
Carolina bench and bar want to rediscover the Declaration of Rights.
The present section asserts why they should.
A. The Constitutional Imperative
"North Carolina lawyers have an obligation to be conversant with
the North Carolina Constitution and to urge upon the courts consider-
ation of its provisions in the resolution of issues to which they per-
tain.""'o Indeed, the obligation is an ethical one, rooted both in our
oath".' to the Constitution itself and in our promise to be compe-
tent,112 diligent" 3 advocates.
Importantly, this obligation is no less important for members of the
judiciary.11 4 Without pulling any punches, former Justice Harry Mar-
tin said that
when the state court merely parrots the United States Supreme Court
in decisions involving rights guaranteed by the state constitution, it
forsakes its duty to develop a body of state constitutional law neces-
sary to protect the rights of the people. Such failure would frustrate
the very purpose of having a state constitution. The rights of the peo-
ple of North Carolina are protected by two constitutions; common
sense dictates that two bodies of law should implement those
protections.s1 5
Accordingly, our ethical duty conscripts us into the business of inde-
pendent state constitutional interpretation.
Even more, we need independent state constitutional interpretation
because "[a] frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is abso-
109. See, e.g., supra notes 7, 11, 93.
110. James G. Exum, Jr., Foreword to JOHN V. ORTH, THE, NORTH CAROLINA STATE CON-
STITUTION xv (Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
111. The North Carolina State Bar Oath of Office, http://www.ncbar.com/PDFs/oath.pdf
(last visited April 29, 2013).
112. N.C. RuLEs OF PROF'I CONDUcr R. 1.3 (1997) (amended 2003). See also Christine M.
Durham, Filling a Scholarly Void, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-6 ("[W]hen attorneys neglect
to brief a pertinent legal point, including a state constitutional one, they are flirting with
malpractice.").
113. N.C. RULES Of PRo'r' CONDuce R. 1.3.
114. Exum, supra note 110 at xv-xvi ("North Carolina Courts have an obligation to deepen
their understanding of the [North Carolina Constitution].").
115. Martin, supra note 7, at 1752.
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lutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty."1 1 6 The North
Carolina Constitution in general, and the Declaration of Rights in par-
ticular, is the fons et origo of our fundamental principles.'1 7 Thus,
"state courts no less than federal are and ought to be the guardians of
our liberties."ns Indeed, the framers responsible for the Federal Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights explicitly recognized the limitations of
that document, leaving it to the states and to the people to further
protect individual liberties."' We must not, and cannot, abdicate that
responsibility.
B. Next Steps
With the clarion call sounded, there are three actions that the North
Carolina bench and bar can take to usher in a new resurgence of inde-
pendent state constitutional interpretation. First, all North Carolina
attorneys need to familiarize themselves with the document. "Its intel-
ligent use requires at a minimum that lawyers and judges know its
text, its structure and, above all, its history."120 Second, North Caro-
lina attorneys should assert state constitutional claims in their client's
complaint alongside parallel federal claims and argue for greater pro-
tection under the state provisions using neutral principles.121 Indeed,
"[a]s a practical matter, the frequency of state constitutional adjudica-
tions ultimately rests with the bar." 12 2 Third, North Carolina judges
should cite North Carolina constitutional provisions in their opinions
at a greater frequency and decide cases based on the state constitu-
tional provisions as the law allows.123 Together, these three steps can
make an immediate and lasting impact in the field of state constitu-
tional law.
PART V. CONCLUSION
The Declaration of Rights is deeply rooted in our state's history.
The thirty-seven rights it declares are to be held and guarded by all
116. N.C. CONs-r. art. I, § 35.
117. In the words of Justice Brennan, "[s]tate constitutions, too, are a font of individual liber-
ties . . . for without [them], the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed." Brennan,
supra note 6, at 491.
118. Id.
119. See U.S. CONsr. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
120. Exum, supra note 110, at xvi. For the authoritative source of North Carolina Constitu-
tional history, see ORTHI, supra note 4. 1 would also commend the other scholarly works cited
herein as useful resources for this endeavor.
121. Notably, Martin & Smith report a trend of increased reliance on and citation of the
North Carolina Constitution since the 1970s. See Martin & Smith, supra note 7, at 768.
122. Id. at 769.
123. See Shepard, supra note 6 (providing examples and analysis of what Chief Justice Shep-
ard calls "legitimate" and "illegitimate" state constitutional decisonmaking).
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North Carolinians. However, the lawyers and judges that serve North
Carolina have the greater responsibility to nurture them. Over the
years, we have seen a few North Carolina lawyers and jurists ably cul-
tivate this field and plant the seed. The climate may be federal, but
North Carolina's legal profession must ensure that the ground in
North Carolina remains fertile.
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